Standard foreign direct investment (FDI) theory suggests that falling trade costs should discourage horizontal FDI. Most FDI is horizontal. Yet, the world witnessed an FDI boom in 1990s, a period of striking falls in trade barriers. This paper carries out an empirical analysis with rich, …rm-level data on the activities of Swedish multinationals around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998 to shed light on this apparent con ‡ict. The analysis is based on the predictions of a recent literature with an industrial organization (IO) angle: Trade costs have asymmetric e¤ects on foreign expansion modes. This view posits that falling trade costs encourage entry realized as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), one of the potential explanations for the con ‡ict between received theory and recent trends in FDI. Empirical results con…rm the …ndings of this recent literature and add to it by testing its extensions.
Introduction
Standard foreign direct investment (FDI) theory gets its momentum from the so-called proximityconcentration trade-o¤. Firms invest overseas when bene…ts of doing so outweigh the loss of scale economies from serving foreign markets from the home country. A natural conclusion is that falling trade costs should discourage horizontal FDI. Most FDI is horizontal not vertical. Yet, the world witnessed an FDI boom in 1990s, a period of striking falls in trade barriers; hence the paradox. Neary (2009) provides an excellent discussion of this con ‡ict and o¤ers two possible resolutions:
First, intra-bloc trade liberalization encourages horizontal FDI in trading blocs since foreign …rms can use one of the member countries as an export-platform to serve the entire region. Second, the now-dominant way of conducting FDI, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) increase rather than decrease with falling trade costs. The latter, which I will call the industrial organization (IO) view from now on, is the central thrust of the current paper.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake foreign direct investment in di¤erent formats:
Cross-border M&As, green…eld FDI, joint ventures, partial acquisitions, and di¤erent forms of low-equity commitment such as sales o¢ces, licensing, research centers, etc. In this paper, a multinational may enter a host market by acquiring/merging with an already existing local …rm (cross-border M&As) or by establishing a new venture (green…eld FDI). Alternative is to serve the foreign market with exporting, which could potentially capture the low-equity modes of foreign expansion. 1 In standard FDI theory, green…eld FDI is implicitly assumed as the only way to expand production in another country. However, recent data show that cross-border M&As have a more than negligible role in foreign market access by multinational …rms. For example, the share of total M&As in world FDI ‡ows has increased from 52% in 1987 to 83% in 2000 and then declined for a brief period at the beginning of the new millennium. 2 In this paper, I investigate empirically the role of trade costs in the entry mode choice of MNEs. 1 Due to lack of data, the gray area between wholly owned operations and exports could not be included in the analysis in this paper. 2 
See World Investment Report (2007).
This is important because di¤erent entry modes have di¤ering degrees of impact on the inter/intra…rm resource transfers. These transfers cause industrial restructuring which in turn alters the income distribution in the host country through its e¤ect on factor prices. 3 only by large, productive and diversi…ed …rms but also small, less productive and naive ones, too.
These results lend themselves to empirical testing.
Main innovations present in the empirical part are as follows: First, I include all three foreign access strategies (cross-border M&As, green…eld FDI and exporting) in the analysis, which di¤ers from many studies that only include two of the strategies at a time. Second, I employ a di¤erent de…nition of horizontal investments. In particular, I use the composition of a¢liate sales to single out horizontal investments rather than industry classi…cations. Third, I apply the multivariate probit model to account for the correlation between di¤erent entry strategies, which reduces the inconsistency of the estimators signi…cantly.
Results of the empirical analysis show that falling trade costs increase the likelihood of crossborder M&As as conjectured by recent studies. Entry mode decision of an MNE is a complex one and there are many asymmetries involved when it comes to the impact of trade costs on 3 Neary (2007), Bertrand and Zitouna (2006) , and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) are recent theory papers focusing on di¤erent aspects of industry restructuring after M&As. See Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004) and Breinlich (2008) for latest related empirical work. 4 See World Investment Report (2007) for the a¢liate sales and global exports information.
this decision. First, cross-border M&As and exporting are complements not substitutes in their response to trade costs. Second, M&As are even more severely a¤ected by changes in trade costs than exports. Third, …rms with bigger size or many foreign a¢liates are more immune to changes in trade costs, whereas small, single a¢liate …rms are severely a¤ected. These results con…rm the …ndings of the recent literature with an IO angle on the e¤ects of trade costs on FDI and add to it by testing a number of extensions of this view.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section, I present the background material in a manner closely related to Neary (2009) . In Section 3, I lay out a very simple model and present the testable hypotheses generated from it. In section 4, I discuss the econometric analysis. Sections 5
reports the results and I conclude in Section 6.
Background

Horizontal FDI
The theory of horizontal FDI originates from the idea of proximity-concentration trade-o¤. It is now standard in the FDI literature and needs no extended discussion here. 5 The idea is elegant and simple indeed. Firms serve foreign markets either by exporting or by producing in that market.
When trade costs get higher, exporting becomes more expensive. To avoid paying high tari¤s, …rms choose investing abroad; hence the term tari¤-jumping. Across time, sectors and space falling trade costs encourage exports over FDI.
There is indeed considerable but not overwhelming econometric evidence for the proximityconcentration trade-o¤. Brainard (1997) provides support for the tari¤-jumping motive by using industry level data for U.S. multinationals. She …nds that the share of FDI increases relative to exports the higher the trade barriers; however, she reports the e¤ect being much weaker in explaining the level of a¢liate sales and the probability of observing any a¢liate sales.
Brainard's results in regards to the e¤ects of trade costs on FDI are very similar to the conclusions of the well-known knowledge capital model (Markusen, 2002) . Predictions of this model over the structure of FDI are highly nonlinear in the relevant country and industry characteristics.
Horizontal multinationals are found to be dominant if countries are similar in size and relative endowments and if transport costs are high.
Vertical FDI
The theory of vertical FDI originated by Helpman (1984) postulates that incentives for vertical fragmentation arise from international di¤erences in factor endowments when stages of production di¤er in their factor intensities. The simplest version of the model assumes two production stages:
headquarter services located in the parent country and production located in the most pro…table location. Ignoring the demand in the host country, the …rm can remain domestic and serve its home market from its parent plant. 6 It incurs high factor costs but no trade costs. Alternatively, the …rm can engage in FDI and export all its output back home. In that case, it incurs lower factor costs accompanied by trade costs. In short, the model presents a tension between factor price di¤erences and trade costs. Lower trade costs encourage FDI in contrast to the horizontal FDI model. 
Export-platform FDI
The idea behind the export-platform FDI is more complex than both the horizontal and vertical FDI models. Motta and Norman (1996) 
Cross-border M&As
In the literature I have discussed so far green…eld FDI is implicitly assumed to be the only way to expand production in another country. However, recent data show that an overwhelming majority of overseas investments are in the form of cross-border M&As. In the …rst stage, entry mode decision is made and product market interaction takes place in the second stage. I will try to trim the model down to its bare essentials, focus on the assumptions, and present results in their simplest forms.
Setting. Consider a potential multinational …rm m from the parent country seeking to determine the optimal mode of serving industry j in host country k with n identical local …rms where n 2: assume that = 0, in other words, either the transferred technology is completely useless or no technology is transferred to the acquired entity. It is helpful to examine this simple case to highlight the impact of trade costs on the entry decision which is the main focus of the present paper. 7 In essence, the marginal cost of the acquired entity is the same as the local competitors, c A m = c. 8 In case of exporting there are added trade costs 2 (0; c), so c E m = c + :
The …xed costs of production change with the mode of entry also. Zero …xed costs are assumed for the case of exporting. In the case of green…eld FDI, there is a given …xed cost of entry F G ; and in the case of M&As the initial sum to be incurred or the acquisition price F A ; is endogenously determined by a simple bargaining process.
We can now state …rm m's pro…ts from alternative ways of serving the market:
The signs under arguments indicate that operating pro…ts , are decreasing in own production and trade costs and the number of …rms, and increasing in the production cost savings provided by the 7 In case of positive technology transfers, results related to trade costs still hold but the proofs become more complicated. See Tekin-Koru (2009) for more detail. 8 There are two, non-exclusive arguments to defend a zero technology transfer in the case of an M&A. "First, with acquisitions, the multinational acquires existing assets and 'inherits' a labor force. Both the machinery and personnel (workers and management) may not be suitable for the exploitation of the multinational's assets. Second, the multinational may decide not to deploy its …rm speci…c assets in the host country for the fear that they may di¤use to competitors, e.g. via personnel movements (as in Siotis 1999) . Either one or both of these motives provide a justi…cation for the multinational's choice to use the existing technology in the host market." (Tekin-Koru, 2009, p.560) ownership of …rm-speci…c assets.
The foundation of the proximity-concentration trade-o¤ and what it implies are immediately clear. Higher …xed costs favor exporting over green…eld FDI, whereas higher trade costs favor green…eld FDI over exporting. It is a simple yet powerful result. It is also a result oblivious to the possibility of a cross-border M&A whose initial cost can be di¤erent for di¤erent levels of trade costs. Thus, it is worth teasing out the riches that come with an M&A.
Bargaining. In the …rst stage of the game, …rms m and`seek to split a total surplus if and only if they agree on a speci…c division. 9 If there is no agreement, then each party would take up its outside opportunity. When exporting is the best alternative to an M&A form …rm
, the multinational prefers an M&A if the payo¤ from that is greater than the payo¤ from exporting. Similarly, when green…eld FDI is the best alternative to an M&A
, the multinational prefers an M&A if the payo¤ from that is greater than the payo¤ from green…eld FDI.
Let F A be proportional to the payo¤ from the outside opportunity, namely the reservation price of the selling party R À and inversely proportional to the bargaining strength 2 (0; 1) of the buying party:
where
È (c ; ;
Comparative statics. Let me now discuss how trade costs may a¤ect the multinational's foreign investment decision. It is obvious from expression (1) that green…eld FDI payo¤ G m is not a¤ected by a change in trade costs , whereas exporting payo¤ E m declines in . Thus, falling trade costs encourage exporting. The e¤ect of trade costs on cross-border M&As is not immediately clear, however. The following hypotheses can be obtained from this simple model to illustrate how trade costs may have an asymmetric e¤ect on a multinational's entry mode decision:
Hypothesis 1 Falling trade costs discourage green…eld FDI and encourage cross-border M&As and exporting. 9 Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) state that a merger between two …rms is not pro…table in an industry with more than two identical …rms. Neary (2007) shows that unless costs are very similar bilateral mergers are indeed pro…table. Tekin-Koru (2009) notices that for …rm`the relevant options are M&As with n 1 …rms, or exports or green…eld FDI with n …rms. There is no surplus in the Salant et al. (1983) sense, however, the alternative to an M&A is to have an additional …rm active in the market. Therefore, here I will assume that bilateral M&As are pro…table.
The cross-border M&A payo¤ is not a¤ected if the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement is green…eld FDI. However, if exporting is the next best alternative, then di¤erentiating A m with respect to trade costs gives
Notice that the acquisition price F A is proportional to the reservation price of the local …rm R À .
When exporting is the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement, falling trade costs reduce the pro…tability of the local incumbent in a likely exporting scenario È . Hence, the reservation Furthermore, if
, then falling trade costs encourage M&As even more so than exports. This last enunciation holds as long as the local incumbent is more sensitive to trade costs than the multinational. Indeed this may be the case if the two …rms are similarly productive (low ) and trade costs are not negligible (high ). A major implication of this result is that broader globalization should promote FDI rather than relegate it.
Hypothesis 2 Falling trade costs induce relatively more M&As by multinationals with less bargaining power.
Due to a decline in the reservation price of the acquisition target, falling trade costs make M&As cheaper for all …rms compared to the high trade cost regime. Nevertheless, it is relatively more so for …rms with much less bargaining power. To see this, let us di¤erentiate expression (4) with respect to :
Imagine a multinational with very low . This will make the acquisition price F A much higher for this particular …rm. Falling trade costs will reduce the reservation price of the acquisition target. Since the …nal acquisition price is inversely proportional to the bargaining strength of the multinational, relative decline in the acquisition price will be much more pronounced for this type 
Econometric analysis
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that trade costs can have asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent ways of serving a foreign market. The following econometric analysis provides the impact of trade costs on foreign entry modes by using a sample of Swedish multinational …rms.
Econometric model
Hypothesis 1 in the previous section states that trade costs have asymmetric e¤ects on a multinational's mode of foreign expansion. While green…eld FDI declines with falling trade costs, cross-border M&As and exporting are encouraged. Put it di¤erently, exporting and cross-border M&As are complements rather than substitutes. I use the following speci…cation to test these predictions:
where y ijkt;s is a binary indicator if …rm i's entry into industry j in country k during time period t in the form of s 2 fA; G; Eg, jkt denotes trade costs, x it is a vector of …rm-speci…c variables, and
x kt is a vector of country-speci…c variables. I also include time, industry and country …xed e¤ects in all speci…cations to account for the e¤ect of unobservables. 10 Hypothesis 2 involves asymmetry. In the face of rapid trade liberalization, multinationals without much bargaining power conduct relatively more M&As. To test this prediction I include an interaction term of trade costs and bargaining power in expression (6):
The nested logit model is the most appropriate econometric method to use since the MNE …rst …gures out the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement and then enters. However, the data does not involve any choice speci…c attributes (variables speci…c to each entry mode, such as the cost of M&As or green…eld …xed costs), which makes implementing the nested logit model impossible. Therefore, the paper adheres to the most general setting where the …rm decides if and how to enter. 11 Accounting for correlation can be very important in qualitative response models such as the one in the current study, since controlling for it can reduce the inconsistency of the estimators signi…cantly. Hence, the next best econometric model is a multivariate probit because it allows a ‡exible pattern of conditional covariance among the latent utilities of alternatives.
Applications of multivariate probit models in higher dimensions have been limited until recently due to the fact that required integrations of the multivariate normal density over subsets of Euclidian space are computationally burdensome. However, the development of the highly accurate GewekeHajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) probability simulator opened a gate for the applications. In this paper, the simulated maximum likelihood method using a GHK simulator is adopted, since it is found to be superior to the other simulation based models in Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994).
In this paper, I use both the bivariate probit and the multivariate probit models. I begin with the bivariate probit model, because it provides the bene…t of being able to calculate the marginal e¤ects for each entry strategy. 12 First, I estimate tari¤ e¤ects on FDI (M&A and green…eld together) versus exporting, because it would provide a useful comparison to some of the existing literature that does not take di¤erent entry modes into account. When the bivariate probit is used for the choice between FDI and exporting, there are two equations (one for FDI and one for exporting) and two binary dependent variables, y ijkt;F DI (1 if there is FDI and 0 otherwise) and y ijkt;E (1 if there is exporting and 0 otherwise). If the MNE chooses FDI, then y ijkt;F DI = 1 and y ijkt;E = 0.
If the MNE chooses exporting, then y ijkt;F DI = 0 and y ijkt;E = 1. The independence of residuals is tested by using an LR test to explore the existence of nesting possibilities if any. analysis and come to a conclusion that as long as the number of random draws and the sample size are large enough the two methods yield very similar predictions. Since these two conditions are satis…ed in the estimations in this paper, I use bivariate probit estimation to give a ‡avor of the economic size of the estimates.
The dependent variable
In this section, I discuss the de…nition of entry modes used in the empirical setting and provide The data do not include exporter-only …rms or purely domestic Swedish …rms. However, the model presented in Section 3 is applicable investigating how an already existing multinational …rm expands in a new host country (or in an expanding host country). There is a great deal of variation in the degree of multinationality in the data. More than half of the …rms are single a¢liate multinationals. An overwhelming majority of …rms have foreign operations in just a few countries.
When a new opportunity to serve a host country arises, this chance may come to a multinational active in another market. Therefore, the data might still capture the model quite well.
For the present analysis I adopt the de…nitions of cross-border M&As and green…eld FDI as in the RIIE survey. More particularly, RIIE asks the following four questions to each foreign a¢liate:
(1) From what year has the a¢liate been a production company of the group? (2) Was the a¢liate a sales company of the group before the year mentioned above? (3) Did the a¢liate operate as a production company of another group before the year mentioned above? (4) Was the a¢liate a state-owned company before the year mentioned above? If the answers to last three questions are all negative, then the investment is classi…ed as a green…eld FDI. If the answer to question 3 is a¢rmative, then it is a cross-border M&A. 13 The theory presented in Section 3 and the IO view refer explicitly to the so-called horizontal FDI: FDI made in order to produce a …nal good for sales in the host country. There are other types of FDI which are ignored in these models such as production in the host country to export 1 3 The frequency of a¢liates born from sales companies of the group and the state-owned enterprise acquisitions is low. Nevertheless, they do not consider green…eld FDI. They de…ne horizontal M&As as mergers between …rms within the same industry, whereas non-horizontal M&As as mergers between …rms in di¤erent industries. This is a reasonable way of di¤erentiating; yet, given that the Swedish data have more detail than industry classi…cations, I use the composition of a¢liate sales to single out horizontal investments. Figure 2 shows the sales composition of Swedish MNEs for all newly established foreign a¢liates between 1987 and 1998. On average, 71% of the a¢liate production is for local sales, 21% for exports to third countries and 8% for exports back to Sweden. The majority of investments seem to be horizontal. In Figure 2 vertical FDI is negligible but there is a noteworthy level of export platform FDI. When the local country is used as an export platform, it is not clear whether the MNE hurts the local incumbents by entering. If that is the case, in other words, if the local incumbent is also an exporter to the same third country, then falling trade costs are expected to reduce the acquisition price as in the horizontal FDI scenario. Otherwise, the e¤ect of the host country tari¤ on the export platform FDI is not that clear-cut. Taking all this and the IO theories discussed in Section 2 and 3 into consideration, I only include newly established a¢liates for which the share of production for the local market is more than 75% of their total production. 14 1 4 Results using the entire sample, which are excluded for brevity and available upon request, are very similar to Developed countries o¤er a large and growing demand coupled with ease of …nding sub-contractors and distribution channels all of which favor entry.
Fourth and last, developed countries supply a higher number of high quality acquisition targets. 
Measuring trade costs
In this study I consider two components of trade costs: trade barriers and transportation costs. The latter is proxied by Distance measured using the great circle formula. This formula approximates the shape of the earth as a sphere and calculates the minimum distance along the surface between Sweden and a foreign country. 15 As a measure of transportation costs I expect it to have a positive impact on M&As and a negative impact on green…eld FDI. However, distance also proxies for the possibilities of personal contact between managers and customers and cultural di¤erences across countries. These tend to reduce transfers of information and the establishment of trust. Therefore, distance may negatively a¤ect all types of FDI.
Trade barriers measure Tari¤ is constructed by using data from UNCTAD-TRAINS data put together by Jon Haveman under the "Ultimate Trade Barrier Catalog". 16 It includes information on 1 5 Results are similar with geographic centers formula and thus not reported for brevity. This may be due to the fact that majority of Swedish a¢liates are in Western Europe with small countries where this is likely not much of an issue. tari¤, nontari¤ barriers (NTBs) and trade data at the six-digit HS industry level for 103 countries.
I compute unweighted and weighted averages at the four-digit ISIC (Rev.3) industry level where the largest share of the a¢liate production takes place. Then, I map these …gures into the two-digit RIIE industry level by using concordances provided by the Statistics Sweden. I only report results for the unweighted tari¤ means to maximize the number of observations in regressions.
I also compute NTBs as a measure of trade barriers for Swedish MNEs. However, the aggregation of NTBs to two-digit RIIE industry level is very ad hoc since NTB is an indicator variable (with an overwhelming majority of 1s as opposed to 0s) pointing out only the existence of a certain type of trade restriction. There is no information on the extent of its use. As can be expected the regressions using the NTBs at this aggregation level do not give any robust results and therefore I do not report them here. Table 2 lists all countries included in the sample, their average tari¤ rate, distance from Sweden, the number of …rms producing there in 1998, and the sum of all Swedish M&As and green…eld FDIs in the sample period. Table 2 does not reveal much about the relationship between trade costs and Table 3 presents the number of cross-border M&As and green…eld FDI along with the average tari¤ levels by these broad industry categories. Fabricated metal products, chemicals, paper products and electrical machinery are the sectors with highest foreign entry. These sectors re ‡ect the comparative advantage of Sweden. Beyond that, however, observe that average tari¤ in these industries are not the highest, which warrants some further exploration.
Firm characteristics
The model provided in Section 3 is a highly stylized one and its raison d'être is to provide a framework for the empirical analysis. The controls used in the regressions hereafter are inspired both from this simple model and the broader FDI literature. M&As. On the other hand, it may also promote M&As because experienced MNEs are able to monitor their partners more e¤ectively. Therefore, the expected sign is positive for both entry strategies yet the strength of this e¤ect on each entry mode is ambiguous.
A¤world represents a broad international experience that fosters FDI by MNEs (Caves, 2007) .
The expected sign for this variable for both entry modes is positive. However, I expect a stronger positive for cross-border M&As since international experience is anticipated to boost the bargaining strength and thus the probability of M&As. I also use …rm size measured by total employment in the …rm as an indicator of the bargaining strength (results not reported in the paper due to brevity but available upon request), since larger …rms with deep pockets are considered to be more experienced and stronger bargainers (See Caves, 2007).
Country characteristics
The GDP per capita is used to account for the availability of acquisition targets in the host country because it is a broad measure of general level of development. Even though it is easier to …nd subcontractors and distribution channels in developed countries, which in fact favors entry, another important issue is that a developed country supplies a bigger number of more high quality acquisition targets. It is harder to …nd suitable acquisition targets in less developed countries. Therefore, acquisitions are expected to be more favorable in countries with high GDP/capita. Summary statistics and a correlations table are provided in the Appendix.
Results
FDI versus exporting
I begin with the bivariate probit estimates of tari¤ e¤ects on both types of FDI by Swedish multinationals, since it puts the results in perspective with respect to the existing literature with no distinction between cross-border M&As and green…eld FDI. The …rst two columns in Table 4 present the coe¢cient estimates whereas the last two columns include the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the success probability of each strategy. All regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry …xed e¤ects. Wald 2 is 1271 indicating a good …t. Correlation coe¢cient is signi…cant revealing that FDI and E are not independent from each other as strategies.
Tari¤ is barely signi…cant and positive in equation FDI (column 1) and negative and signi…cant in equation E (column 2), revealing that falling trade costs discourage FDI by Swedish multinationals. This is in line with the tari¤-jumping argument in the previous literature where researchers generally have found a signi…cant positive e¤ect of trade costs on multinational entry without di¤erentiating between di¤erent entry modes using aggregate data. 18 Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an in…nitesimal increase in Tari¤ increase the probability of FDI by 10.3%. Although this is not large in absolute magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of 3% (given as success probability in the bottom of Turning to other coe¢cient estimates in the …rst two columns of Table 4 
Cross-border M&As versus green…eld FDI
Before estimating the full model, I turn to the bivariate probit estimates of tari¤ e¤ects on new entry by Swedish multinationals through cross-border M&As and green…eld FDI, because the use of bivariate probit model provides the bene…t of being able to calculate the marginal e¤ects for each entry strategy. The …rst two columns in Table 5 present the coe¢cient estimates whereas the last two columns include the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the success probability of each strategy. All regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry …xed e¤ects. Wald Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an in…nitesimal increase in Tari¤ reduces the probability of a cross-border M&A by 11.5%. Again, although this seems small in absolute magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of 2% (given as success probability in the bottom of Table 5 ), this is economically meaningful.
Turning to other coe¢cient estimates in the …rst two columns of Table 5 Table 6 reports the multivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of trade costs on the probability of conducting A, G or E. The …rst three columns report the baseline speci…cation without the interaction terms as in Equation (6), whereas the last three columns present results with the interaction terms as in Equation (7). Wald 2 for the …rst speci…cation is 1280 and for the second is 1295 indicating a good …t.
Exporting versus cross-border M&As versus green…eld FDI
Also notice that the correlation coe¢cient between A and G ( AG ) is almost insigni…cant, whereas that between A and E ( AE ) and G and E ( GE ), are both signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This suggests a nested structure where …rst the decision of foreign entry is made and then the mode of entry is chosen. However, as stated earlier, the use of a nested logit models is impossible due to the lack of choice speci…c attributes in the dataset.
In Table 6 , in line with Hypothesis 1 and the main conjecture from the IO view, the variable of interest, Tari¤, decreases the likelihood of cross-border M&As. The odds of E also declines in Tari¤, which suggests that cross-border M&As and exporting are complements rather than substitutes as discussed in Neary (2007) . It is worth recognizing that although it is not signi…cant, Tari¤ carries the traditional theory predicted positive coe¢cient in equation G in column 2.
The e¤ect of tari¤ barriers is negative for both cross-border M&As and exporting, supporting Hypothesis 1 from the theory. Interestingly though, the adverse e¤ect of trade costs measured as tari¤s is somewhat stronger for cross-border M&As. In other words, trade liberalization can induce more cross-border M&As than exporting. This is a new result.
Most of the other covariates exhibit their expected signs, though some are insigni…cant. Throughout almost all equations A¤world have signi…cant positive signs for both cross-border M&As and (0.000) (0.000) Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry …xed e¤ects.
green…eld FDI, pointing out that Swedish MNEs with bigger size and more international market experience have a higher chance of entering new markets to serve those markets. In short, broad international experience matters.
On the other hand, A¤host always favors cross-border M&As and reduces to odds against G, which suggests that Swedish MNEs endowed with stronger connections to local bureaucracy or knowledge of local business culture prefer cross-border M&As to green…eld FDI. This may also be interpreted as Swedish MNEs with more bargaining power derived from their previous experience in the host market acquire local …rms rather than establishing wholly owned subsidiaries.
Swedish MNEs with high R&D Intensity favor green…eld FDI. GDP/capita (level of host country (0.000) (0.000) Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry …xed e¤ects. Country e¤ects are not used since Distance is time invariant. development) signi…cantly reduces the likelihood exporting. A better business climate in the host country ICRG improves the odds in favor of G and E. A skilled labor force in the host country (Skill ) increases the likelihood of A and reduces the odds for E.
Then, in the last three columns of Table 6 , I examine whether trade cost e¤ects vary across di¤erent types of …rms to test Hypothesis 2 of the theory. To this e¤ect I add the interaction of trade costs with bargaining strength to the previous speci…cation. I use experience in the host country and around the world as proxies for bargaining strength. As expected, the negative impact of trade costs on cross-border M&As declines in bargaining strength. The linear trade cost term (Tari¤ ) is negative and signi…cant and the interaction terms are signi…cantly positive using both A¤host (0.000) (0.000) Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry …xed e¤ects.
and A¤world as indicators of bargaining strength. This result implies that large and experienced …rms may not be as severely a¤ected by trade costs as small …rms. Falling trade costs encourage cross-border M&As conducted by small …rms with less bargaining power more compared to large and experienced …rms with stronger bargaining positions.
As trade costs change Swedish MNEs with a single foreign a¢liate are more likely to be severely a¤ected. Multi-a¢liate MNEs have better and wider distribution networks around the globe and most importantly more international experience. Therefore, the M&As conducted by these …rms might be less prone to changes in trade costs. In short, both knowing the local conditions and the degree of multinationality matter for how profound the e¤ect of trade costs will be on the mode of entry. Table 7 reports the same speci…cations using Distance as the measure of trade costs. From the table it is observed that all foreign expansion strategies decline in trade costs. It is probably because distance is not only a measure of transportation costs but also a measure of degree of information transfers, establishment of trust and cultural di¤erence across countries. Sign and signi…cance of the other variables are similar to the ones in Table 6 .
Next, I turn my attention to investments in OECD countries as Swedish MNEs mainly invest in developed countries which also have lower tari¤ rates than average country. Swedish MNEs invest in nearby developed countries because they have lots of potential M&A targets, and these countries just happen to have low trade costs cross-sectionally. Even though there are country-level regressors to control for level of development of a country and country …xed e¤ects in previous estimations, a more compelling experiment is to restrict the sample to these nearby countries only to avoid potentially spurious results. The …rst three columns of Table 8 reports these results. Notice that results are robust.
As a …nal robustness exercise, I restrict the sample to the subset of …rms that are present in the whole sample. This would deal with two issues -those who drop out to become purely exporters and those who join the sample during it. Although this exercise limits a lot of the time series variation in the sample, conclusions are similar or even stronger.
Conclusion
This paper is an endeavour to …nd an answer to the apparent con ‡ict between the standard FDI theory and recent trends. Standard theory predicts less foreign expansion the lower the trade costs.
However, 1990s were an era of rapid trade liberalization and intensely growing FDI. Standard theory does not di¤erentiate between entry modes whereas newly emerging IO inspired theories underline asymmetries and heterogeneity inherent in FDI. One such asymmetry is the di¤erential impact of trade costs on modes of foreign expansion, the central thrust of the current paper.
In this paper, I attempt to disentangle the tari¤ e¤ects on entry mode decision by carrying out an empirical analysis with rich, …rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNEs around the globe 
